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Judicial Deference Allows European Consensus
to Emerge
Shai Dothan

Abstract
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) searches for human rights policies that
are adopted by the majority of the countries in Europe. Using a doctrine known as “emerging
consensus,” the court then imposes these policies as an international legal obligation on all the
countries under its jurisdiction. But the ECHR sometimes defers to countries, even if their policies
fall short of the standard accepted by most of the countries in Europe. This deference is
accomplished by using the so-called “margin of appreciation” doctrine. Naturally, emerging
consensus and margin of appreciation are often conceived as competing doctrines: the more there
is of one, the less there is of another. This article suggests a novel rationale for the emerging
consensus doctrine: the doctrine can allow the ECHR to make good policies by drawing on the
independent decision-making of many similar countries. In light of that, the article demonstrates
that a correct application of the margin of appreciation doctrine actually helps emerging consensus
reach optimal results by giving countries an incentive to make their policies independently.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is a regional human rights
court located in Strasbourg, France. It monitors compliance with the European
Convention on Human Rights (Convention).1 The Convention guarantees
individuals basic human rights such as the right to life, the right to liberty, and the
right to a fair trial, among many others. Furthermore, the Convention allows
individuals to file applications directly to the court against the countries that
violated their rights.2
The court’s jurisdiction covers forty-seven European countries with a total
of 800 million citizens.3 Since its establishment in 1959, the court has issued
approximately 20,000 judgments,4 making it the most prolific international court
in history.5 Moreover, the court has examined more than 700,000 applications, 6
most of them by individuals claiming their rights were abused.7 The impact of the
court on the life of Europeans is difficult to exaggerate. The court also served as
a model for creating the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, extending its influence far beyond Europe.8
Scholars have noted that the ECHR is starting to behave as a constitutional
court that not only helps specific applicants, but also tries to improve the
protection of human rights across Europe.9 They have studied the ECHR as a

1

2

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 222.
See Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, art. 34, Nov. 11, 1994, E.T.S.
No. 155.

3

See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE CONSCIENCE OF EUROPE: 50 YEARS
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 16 (2010), https://perma.cc/2GFN-7W35.

4

See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ECHR OVERVIEW 1959-2016 3 (2017),
https://perma.cc/5PS7-L3MV.

5

See OCTAVIAN ICHIM, JUST SATISFACTION UNDER
RIGHTS i (2015).

6

See ECHR OVERVIEW 1959-2016, supra note 4, at 4.
A person, non-governmental organization, or group of individuals who were victims of a violation
by a member country may file an application according to article 34 of the Convention. While,
under article 33 of the Convention, the court can also receive applications from countries who are
members of the Convention regarding violations by other member countries, such applications
account for only a fraction of the ones filed. See Dragoljub Popovic, Prevailing of Judicial Activism over
Self-Restraint in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 361, 372
(2009).

7

8
9

THE

EUROPEAN CONVENTION

ON

OF THE

HUMAN

See THE CONSCIENCE OF EUROPE, supra note 3, at 16.
See Joshua L. Jackson, Note, Broniowski v. Poland: A Recipe for Increased Legitimacy of the European Court
of Human Rights as a Supranational Constitutional Court, 39 CONN. L. REV. 759, 777–81 (2006).
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prototype for effective international courts10 and described the judicial tactics used
by the court to attain its enormous power.11
But despite all the praise from academics, the ECHR is under constant fire
from the press and from European politicians.12 Many people think the court is
overreaching and intruding on the sovereignty of countries. They have criticized
the court for making it difficult to extradite criminals and suspected terrorists out
of Europe,13 and for trying to force European countries to allow prisoners to
vote.14
Some countries are trying to push the ECHR to defer more to domestic
authorities and curb its judicial activism. The ECHR has traditionally used a
doctrine called the “margin of appreciation” to justify deference to country
policies. This doctrine is not mentioned in the Convention, and some countries
were concerned that the court doesn’t use it often enough. To address this
problem, representatives from all member countries agreed in April 2012 on the
Brighton Declaration, which calls on the court to apply the margin of appreciation
consistently and, moreover, calls for including the margin of appreciation doctrine

10

See generally Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997) (explaining how lessons from the success of the European
Court of Justice and the ECHR could be used to enhance other international courts).

11

See Shai Dothan, Judicial Tactics in the European Court of Human Rights, 12 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 115 (2011);
SHAI DOTHAN, REPUTATION AND JUDICIAL TACTICS: A THEORY OF NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 212–61 (2015).
See Erik Voeten, Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of International Courts, 14 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 411,
418 (2013) (showing how, following severe criticism of the ECHR in the U.K. press, there was a
sharp decline in the support for the court by the British public).

12

13

14

See Othman (Abu Qatada) v. United Kingdom, 2012-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 159. In this case, the ECHR
prevented the deportation of an extremist Muslim cleric to Jordan because he was supposed to
stand trial for terrorism there and the court feared that the trial would rely on evidence extracted
from others using torture. The cleric was eventually extradited after a lengthy legal struggle. See also
A. A. v. United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. In this case, the court prevented the deportation of
a Nigerian who was convicted of rape at the age of 15. The social ties the applicant developed in
Britain were the reason for preventing the deportation. The British Media fulminated against this
judgment. See James Slack, Social Ties Keep Rapists in Britain, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 21, 2011),
https://perma.cc/EV58-5HAW.
See Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 2005-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 187. In this case, the ECHR decided
that a blanket ban on prisoner voting violates the Convention. See Greens & M.T. v. United
Kingdom, 2010-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 57. In this case, the ECHR required the U.K. to change its laws
on the disenfranchisement of prisoners within six months. British politicians were incredibly critical
of these judgments and the former British Prime Minister David Cameron was even quoted as
saying that giving the right to vote to prisoners makes him “physically ill.” See Andrew Hough,
Prisoner Vote: What MPs said in Heated Debate, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 11, 2011), https://perma.cc/C8FTA7MX.
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in the preamble of the Convention.15 Following the Brighton Declaration, a new
Protocol, Protocol 15, was drafted to amend the Convention. This Protocol
specifically mentions that states enjoy a margin of appreciation. Also, in
accordance with the Brighton Declaration, it refers to the principle of subsidiarity,
according to which states have the primary responsibility to protect the rights
enshrined in the Convention.16 The principle of subsidiarity provides the standard
justification for the margin of appreciation granted to European countries, in
recognition of their special ability to make fitting and legitimate policies for their
own citizens using their own democratic procedures.17 So far, Protocol 15 has
been ratified by thirty-six European Countries, and signed by nine others.18
Although the protocol will not enter into force until ratified by all forty-seven
Convention members, scholars have argued that the ECHR has already started to
restrain itself in response to this powerful backlash.19
Will deference lead to a decline in the vast judicial impact of the ECHR? Not
necessarily. This article highlights a counter-intuitive benefit of the margin of
appreciation doctrine. Surprisingly, margin of appreciation may aid in the correct
use of what many see as its greatest rival: the doctrine of “emerging consensus.”
The emerging consensus doctrine is used by the ECHR to discover the
minimal human rights standards that are respected by at least a majority of the
countries in Europe. This minimal standard is then required from all European
countries. States that do not grant these minimal standards will be found in
violation of the Convention by the ECHR.
Emerging consensus can be justified in light of a simple mathematical model
called the Condorcet Jury Theorem. This model stipulates that a majority vote in
a group of similar decision-makers, who decide independently, is more likely to
be correct than the choice of each individual decision-maker. The problem with
using the Jury Theorem to justify emerging consensus is that not all countries in
Europe are similar in every respect, and some countries may be motivated not to
decide independently.

15

See European Court of Human Rights, Brighton Declaration: High Level Conference on the Future
of the European Court of Human Rights 3–4, ¶ 12 (Apr. 20, 2012), https://perma.cc/QW3G2W9Y.

16

Protocol No. 15 Amending the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 1, June 24, 2013, ETS No. 213.

17

Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L.
907, 912, 918–22 (2005).

18

See the list of ratifications and signatories updated up to July 12, 2017, Chart of Signatures and
Ratifications of Treaty 213, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Oct. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/E3FQ-KXNJ.

19

See Mikael Rask Madsen, Rebalancing European Human Rights: Has the Brighton Declaration Engendered a
New Deal on Human Rights in Europe?, J. INT’L. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (forthcoming 2018),
https://perma.cc/4UCA-TD4Y.
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This is where the margin of appreciation doctrine can assist the correct
application of emerging consensus. Clearly, if a country is fundamentally different
from the rest of Europe, it should be granted a margin of appreciation and the
ECHR should not obligate it to conform to the policies of dissimilar countries.
The ability of the margin of appreciation to assist in satisfying the condition of
independent decision-making is slightly less obvious. Margin of appreciation
allows the ECHR to provide speedy guidance to European countries without
actually finding a violation and risking political backlash. This decreases the
incentive of countries to imitate the policies of their neighbors. Furthermore,
margin of appreciation allows the ECHR to provide a proper warning about the
content of emerging consensus before finding any country in violation. This
decreases the incentive of countries to try to guess where the European consensus
is going by themselves and to follow it in order to preempt future violation
findings against them.
There are also cases in which emerging consensus cannot help the ECHR to
discover good policies. First, when countries are still deliberating about what the
law should be, the ECHR cannot learn much from their current legal positions.
Second, when countries can choose from several legal options based on a balance
of several conflicting considerations, the Jury Theorem logic breaks down. These
cases give rise to the so-called Condorcet Paradox—a situation in which the
choices of group members cannot be aggregated to form a true majority decision.
In these situations, the ECHR should avoid emerging consensus. It may decide to
do that by deferring to the state using margin of appreciation. But it may also
decide to intervene and find a violation based on other doctrines at its disposal.
Section II describes the doctrines of emerging consensus and margin of
appreciation as they are applied by the ECHR. Section III points out that the
application of emerging consensus could be justified as leading to the
informational benefits of the Jury Theorem and discusses potential criticisms of
this argument. Section IV highlights that the ECHR’s use of margin of
appreciation to defer to countries that differ from the rest of Europe can maintain
good policies upheld by these countries. Section V highlights situations in which
although the ECHR’s use of the margin of appreciation could sustain country
policies that are inferior to the European consensus, the use of margin of
appreciation is essential to allow for the correct identification of the European
consensus by the ECHR and to incentivize countries to decide independently.
Section VI addresses situations in which emerging consensus cannot be
adequately discovered. Section VII concludes.
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II. T HE D OCTRINES OF E MERGING C ONSENSUS AND M ARGIN
OF A PPRECIATION
The emerging consensus doctrine directs the ECHR to take current views
on human rights policies into account as it interprets the Convention. It therefore
serves as a tool to adapt the meaning of the Convention over time to changing
conditions.20 There are three common understandings of the doctrine. The first
suggests that the doctrine directs the court to consider the laws of European
countries. The second suggests that the doctrine directs the court to consider the
views of experts. And the third suggests that the doctrine directs the court to
consider the views of the European public.21 Recent empirical evidence reveals
that the ECHR in fact follows a version of the first understanding; if the majority
of European countries protect a certain human right, the ECHR interprets the
Convention as protecting this right and finds countries that infringe this right in
violation of the Convention.22
An interview with a former judge of the ECHR confirms that the research
division of the court often prepares a comparative analysis of the laws in all, or at
least most of, the countries in Europe to assist ECHR judges in Grand Chamber
cases—legally important cases that are referred to a panel of seventeen judges. 23
The comparative report will sometimes include a short description of the law in
every European country, but it will sometimes be limited to answering a simple
identical question about the provisions of the law in every country. If a substantial
majority of the countries in Europe adopted a legal solution or if a little more than
half of the countries adopted a solution that seems to be supported by a growing
trend across Europe, this is an argument judges can use in favor of adopting that
legal solution as the correct interpretation of the Convention. Sometimes the
comparative analysis prepared for the judges is only a minor supportive tool, but
sometimes it affects the result and then judges will usually mention the emerging
consensus argument in their judgment. Judges do not always follow the emerging
consensus in Europe, but they are sometimes criticized for digressing from it by
20

See Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶ 31 (1978) (indicating that the ECHR
should interpret the convention in light of present day conditions, including the developments in
the laws of European countries).

21

See Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL
INT’L L. J. 133, 139 (1993).

22

See Laurence R. Helfer & Erik Voeten, International Courts as Agents of Legal Change: Evidence from
LGBT Rights in Europe, 68 INT’L ORG. 77, 106 (2014); see also KANSTANTSIN DZEHTSIAROU,
EUROPEAN CONSENSUS AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 12,
37 (2015) (explaining that the ECHR will usually identify an emerging consensus even if countries
in Europe are not unanimous but show a convergence towards protecting a certain right, which is
protected by a significant majority of countries).

23

Interview with David Thór Björgvinsson, former judge of the ECHR (Sept. 13, 2016).
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dissenting judges. Judges may be persuaded not to follow emerging consensus
because of arguments based on the margin of appreciation or on respect for
profound moral values of the countries.24
The margin of appreciation doctrine directs the ECHR to grant European
countries some leeway to make their own policies without finding them in
violation of the Convention. The width of the margin of appreciation determines
the amount of leeway granted to the countries. The narrower the margin of
appreciation, the more likely the ECHR will find a country in violation of the
Convention; and the wider the margin of appreciation, the more likely the ECHR
will defer to the country and not find it in violation. The ECHR judgments list a
series of factors that determine the width of the margin of appreciation. These
include the type of rights infringed by the country, the interests at stake, and the
aims pursued by the country when it infringed the rights.25 A key factor that
determines the width of the margin of appreciation is the existence of a European
consensus on the issue.
The ECHR decided that if there is no European consensus regarding the
protection of a certain human right, the margin of appreciation granted to the
countries would be wider than if such a European consensus existed.26 The margin
of appreciation and emerging consensus are therefore competing doctrines. The
more the court is able to identify a European consensus on an issue, the narrower
the margin of appreciation it grants to the countries. The less the court is able to
identify a European consensus, the wider the margin of appreciation it grants to
the countries.27

III. W HY E MERGING C ONSENSUS C AN L EAD TO G OOD
P OLICIES
A. Applying the Jury Theorem
A common intuition is that if many decision-makers consider a problem and
prefer a certain policy over others, this policy is probably a good one and hence a
policy worth following by other actors. The eighteenth century French
philosopher Nicolas de Condorcet developed a model that supports this intuition,
24

Id.

25

See Dickson v. United Kingdom, 2007-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 99, 127–28, ¶¶ 77–78; Dean Spielmann,
Allowing the Right Margin the European Court of Human Rights and the National Margin of Appreciation
Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?, in 14 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 318,
390–403 (Kenneth Armstrong et al. eds., 2012).

26

See Evans v. United Kingdom, 2007-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 353, 382, ¶ 77 .
See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 10, at 316–17; Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus
and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 851 (1999).

27
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known as the Jury Theorem. According to the Jury Theorem, if a group of
decision-makers have to choose between two options, and each individual
decision-maker has an equal probability of more than fifty percent of reaching the
correct result, then the majority’s decision in this group is more likely to be correct
than that of any individual decision-maker. The theorem holds that the larger the
group of decision-makers, the higher the probability that the majority’s decision
will be correct.28
For the Jury Theorem to work, the decision-makers within the group must
satisfy two conditions: they must be similar to each other—otherwise the option
chosen by one may not necessarily suit others; and they must decide independently
and refrain from following each other’s decisions—otherwise, additional decisionmakers do not minimize the risk of error.
Some scholars argue that the Jury Theorem implies that countries should use
comparative law to learn from the experiences of other countries.29 Because
countries make informed and sophisticated assessments on what policies they
should adopt, they resemble decision-makers who are more likely to decide
correctly than to err. Therefore, countries comply with the basic condition for the
applicability of the Jury Theorem. This means that the majority of countries in the
world or in a specific region are likely to adopt better policies than each country
can adopt on its own. Accordingly, the emerging consensus doctrine, which
directs the ECHR to follow the policies used by the majority of European
countries, leads the ECHR to adopt good human rights policies.
Yet emerging consensus will only lead to good policies when the countries
comply with the conditions for the applicability of the Jury Theorem. In other
words, emerging consensus is worth following only as long as the countries
considered are similar and make their policies independently. This article argues
that the ECHR can use the margin of appreciation to limit the application of
emerging consensus to situations in which countries are similar to each other. It
further argues that a proper use of the margin of appreciation would incentivize
countries to decide independently.

28

To illustrate the power of the Jury Theorem, consider this simple numerical example. Imagine a
group of decision-makers deciding by majority vote in which each decision-maker has a 60%
probability to be right. If the group has five members, the probability that the decision of the group
will be correct is 68.3%. For eleven members, the probability is 75.3%. For twenty-one members,
it is 82.6%. For fifty-one members, it is 92.6%. If every decision-maker has a 70% probability to be
right, the results are even more extreme. Five members would have an 83.7% probability to be
right, eleven members would have a 92.2% probability. Twenty-one members would have a 97.4%
probability. With fifty-one members, the right result is practically guaranteed—the probability of
making the right choice is 99.9%.

29

See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131 (2006).
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B. Potential Criticism
It is worth mentioning at this point that the statement that the majority of
countries are likely to decide correctly is not free from criticism. After all, a
European consensus that restricts human rights instead of protecting them may
also develop.30 One can argue, for example, that countries are ruled by political
majorities that serve the interests of some parts of society at the expense of the
rights of minorities. As a result, national policies across Europe—not just in the
country whose case is before the court—are going to discriminate against
minorities.31
Nevertheless, scholars who analyzed the actual application of emerging
consensus by the ECHR suggest that this doctrine is in fact often used to protect
minorities. The court sometimes used emerging consensus to justify intervention
and enforcement of higher standards of minority protection. When the European
consensus violates the rights of minorities, the court will often use its discretion
and decide not to follow emerging consensus. Besides, the standards of human
rights protection in Europe specifically are already quite high, which justifies the
use of emerging consensus to learn from the practices of most European
countries.32
Theoretically speaking, even if every country has minorities and
discriminates against them in certain ways, there is no reason to think that all
countries will discriminate against the same minorities in the same way and push
the European consensus in the same direction. If most countries do not
discriminate in the same manner, they would not form a harmful European
consensus. For example, if a third of the countries violate the right of minorities
to a fair trial, another third harms their freedom of speech, and another third
violates their privacy, the emerging consensus doctrine would obligate all
countries to protect all three rights. After all, the Jury Theorem is based on the
idea that individual decision-makers may be biased, but because they are not
biased in the same direction, their biases will balance themselves out and the
majority’s opinion will be optimal.33
In case of a prevalent and persistent bias against minorities, deferring to the
country is not a better option than following the European consensus. On the
30

31
32
33

See Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 146–47 (2005); Paolo G. Carozza, Uses
and Misuses of Comparative Law in International Human Rights: Some Reflections on the Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1217, 1231 (1998).
See Benvenisti, supra note 27, at 851.
See DZEHTSIAROU, supra note 22, at 122–29.
See Maxwell L. Stearns, The Condorcet Jury Theorem and Judicial Decisionmaking: A Reply to Saul Levmore,
3 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 125, 130–31 (2002).
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contrary, scholars have argued that the ECHR should intervene more in cases that
concern minorities’ rights because national policies are naturally suspect in this
area.34 There is even some evidence that the ECHR actually gives a narrower
margin of appreciation to countries in cases that concern minorities.35 Even if the
European majority cannot be trusted on such issues, any individual country would
be even less trustworthy.
If the court cannot rely on emerging consensus in cases that involve a
persistent bias against a certain minority, it may theoretically rely on abstract moral
principles to justify intervention. Sometimes, this is the only reasonable option.
The problem is that moral principles are contested, and therefore their application
may be arbitrary and may damage the legitimacy of the court’s decision.36 All this
leaves relying on emerging consensus an imperfect tool, but probably the least of
all evils.
One may think about yet another theoretical challenge to the use of emerging
consensus for promoting human rights protection across Europe. The emerging
consensus doctrine is used by the ECHR to set a minimum, a “floor,” of human
rights standards that are required from all countries. Countries are allowed, of
course, to grant more protection than this floor; they are only required not to grant
less protection. The problem is that human rights are often relational: protecting
one right inevitably implies restricting another, forming a “ceiling” for its
protection.37 If the court protects the freedom of speech of journalists, for
example, it will limit the privacy rights of celebrities.
This challenge doesn’t pose any problem to the application of the emerging
consensus doctrine, even if it requires a degree of rhetorical skill from the judges.
The Jury Theorem is useful exactly because it can help solve real dilemmas in
which every choice has both advantages and disadvantages. When a right is
violated—even if this violation itself implies the protection of other rights—the
ECHR can look to the practice of all countries in Europe and examine whether
they allow this violation. If most countries do not allow the violation, either
because they do not view the attendant protection of other rights as sufficiently
34

See Benvenisti, supra note 27; Shai Dothan, In Defence of Expansive Interpretation in the European Court
of Human Rights, 3 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 508, 520–23 (2014).

35

See ANDREW LEGG, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
DEFERENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY 27–31 (2012); Andreas von Staden, The Democratic Legitimacy of
Judicial Review beyond the State: Normative Subsidiarity and Judicial Standards of Review 10 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 1023, 1042 (2012); Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, The Differences that Make a Difference: Recent
Developments on the Discrimination Grounds and the Margin of Appreciation under Article 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 14 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 647, 664–65 (2014).

36

See DZEHTSIAROU, supra note 22, at 117–18.
See FEDERICO FABBRINI, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 38–39 (2014).

37
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important or for any other reason, the emerging consensus doctrine would
counsel the court to find the practice of the country in question in violation of the
Convention. This judicial tool reflects the decisional advantage of the Jury
Theorem.

IV. F ULFILLING THE S IMILARITY C ONDITION
Countries usually shape their human rights regimes to suit the interests of
their citizens.38 When countries are similar to one another, the legal regime chosen
by each country is likely to prove beneficial for the citizens of other countries as
well. All countries differ from each other across many dimensions, but some of
the differences between the countries are irrelevant to certain legal choices. In
contrast, a country’s unique attributes should affect other legal choices. If the
difference between the countries is relevant to the nature of the preferred legal
regime, the experience of other countries is a less useful tool to discover the
proper law.
The differences between European countries are probably less significant
than the differences between countries all over the world. All countries in the
Council of Europe are democracies39 and share the same region. Many of the
countries also share a common heritage and similar political ideals. This suggests
that the use of emerging consensus within Europe can lead to better results than
the use of comparative law to learn from countries around the world.
That said, some European countries differ from others in legally relevant
respects. If a country is different from the rest of Europe, the laws adopted by
other countries may not be beneficial for the citizens of that country. In these
cases, the ECHR should grant a wider margin of appreciation to the country and
defer to its policies in many respects.
In Şahin v. Turkey,40 for example, a practicing Muslim female student who
viewed it as her religious duty to wear a headscarf brought an application against
Turkey. She argued that regulations in a Turkish university that forbade her from
wearing a headscarf infringed her freedom of religion protected by the
Convention. Because no other European country has forbade the wearing of the
Islamic headscarf at a university, the overwhelming European consensus, in her
view, should limit Turkey’s margin of appreciation and condemn its regulations as
38

39

40

See Shany, supra note 17, at 920 (arguing that human rights regimes chosen by each country do not
create significant externalities on the other countries, thus implying that countries do not have to
counter foreign influence and instead can shape their legal regimes to suit their citizens’ interests).
The fact that European countries are democracies also implies that many of their laws are
determined in majoritarian institutions that are likely, according to the Jury Theorem logic, to lead
to good policies, and hence to policies that should be followed by other countries.
Şahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173.
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a violation of the Convention.41 The ECHR considered the fact that Turkey was
significantly different from the other European countries—it is a country
inhabited predominantly by Muslims, while its unique history and its fear of
extremist groups strongly commit it to secularism.42 In light of that, the court
granted Turkey a margin of appreciation and decided that its practices did not
violate the Convention.
In some issue areas, all European countries are different from each other,
and therefore the European consensus is less instructive. For example, while
Turkey may indeed be unique in terms of its religious dilemmas, the court in the
Şahin case also stressed the fact that attitudes towards religious symbols are diverse
across Europe generally. Such diversity supports greater deference to the
countries’ policies.43
When the ECHR applies a wider margin of appreciation to a country because
it is different, it can therefore sustain a regime that is more suitable to the citizens
of that country than the regime adopted by the majority of European countries.44
Under these conditions, granting the country a wide margin of appreciation would
therefore keep good policies in place.

V. E NSURING A G ENUINE C ONSENSUS
The optimal human rights policies are adopted if all European countries
make their policies independently and the ECHR applies the policies used by the
majority to all the countries that are not fundamentally different from the rest of
Europe. But sometimes the ECHR strategically digresses from the correct
application of emerging consensus. This behavior may suit the court’s interest, but
it jeopardizes the collective European interest in adopting the best policies.
Countries may also serve their own interests and fail to decide independently. In
these cases, the ECHR cannot discover the best policies by following emerging
consensus. This suggests that a proper use of the margin of appreciation doctrine
can give both the ECHR and the countries incentives to act in ways that would
allow emerging consensus to discover the best human rights policies.

41

See id. at 201, ¶ 100.

42

See id. at 205–08, ¶ 114. For criticism of this decisions, see id. at 221–22, ¶ 3 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
See id. at 204, ¶ 109.

43
44

Even if a country is not different from the other countries, it may have vastly superior skills at
making good policies and should therefore stick to its own policies instead of learning from other
countries. The Jury Theorem implies, however, that errors are minimized extremely effectively as
the size of the deciding group increases. As can be seen from the numerical example in note 28,
supra, even a small number of decision-makers can do much better than a single highly sophisticated
actor. The possibility that one country would have better decision-making abilities than a group of
forty-seven countries, provided these countries all face similar conditions, is very unlikely.
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A. The ECHR Manipulates Its Decisions to Avoid Backlash
When the ECHR issues judgments interpreting the Convention, it applies
doctrines such as emerging consensus that are well grounded in its case law. These
doctrines shape the court’s decision, but they are not its sole determinant. The
ECHR, like other international courts, also shapes its judgments in light of the
possibility that certain decisions may provoke countries to harm the court’s
interest.45 For example, countries may fail to comply with judgments they view as
excessively demanding.46 Countries may also criticize the court in ways that can
prove disastrous to its public support across Europe. In extreme circumstances,
countries may even try to damage the court’s budget, to change the Convention,
or to leave the court’s jurisdiction.47 If the ECHR does not consider this possibility
of backlash, it may risk losing its ability to function as an effective institution and
ultimately its ability to set policies that are followed across Europe.
The ECHR may therefore change its decision and digress from the accurate
application of emerging consensus in order not to provoke countries to harm its
interests. To the extent that emerging consensus leads the ECHR to the best
possible result, the ECHR’s strategic behavior may lead it to issue judgments that
adopt inferior policies. If countries conform to the policies required by the
ECHR’s judgments, they may adopt bad laws.
The margin of appreciation doctrine allows the ECHR not to find a country
in violation of the Convention without at the same time characterizing it as
conforming to the European consensus. A judgment that relies on the margin of
appreciation to prevent a finding of violation does not present the country’s
actions as conforming to the European consensus. As a result, other countries
that seek to follow emerging consensus as a tool for making good policies would
not try to imitate the policy adopted by that country. European countries would
realize that the country’s conduct was saved from a finding of violation not
because it conformed to the European consensus, but because the country was
granted a margin of appreciation.
If the ECHR grants the country a margin of appreciation, no violation is
found and no acts of compliance are required. Consequently, the country cannot
express its protest by noncompliance. Because the ECHR ultimately approves the
country’s practices, the country is also much less likely to criticize the court or to
harm it in any other way than if the court found it in violation. The margin of

46

See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response
to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. REV. 899, 942–44 (2005) (arguing that only a subset of the
decisions that are legally possible are also politically possible for international judges); Tom
Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 631, 632 (2005)
(arguing that international courts are constrained by the preferences of countries).
See Dothan, supra note 11, at 122.

47

See Ginsburg, supra note 45 at 656–68; DOTHAN, supra note 11, at 61–113.
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appreciation therefore allows the ECHR to establish an emerging consensus
accurately and present it in its judgment, while minimizing the fear of backlash by
not finding the country in violation. An accurate presentation of the emerging
consensus is crucial as a tool to guide other countries to adopt good policies.
But the margin of appreciation is more than just a tool to facilitate the honest
application of emerging consensus. More generally, it allows the ECHR to avoid
making false doctrinal rulings by giving it a way out of finding countries in
violation, while at the same time not presenting their conduct as conforming to a
correct reading of the Convention. For example, in the case of Ireland v. United
Kingdom,48 the ECHR reviewed the special emergency measures that the U.K. took
against terrorists in Ireland during the 1970s. When scrutinizing the measure of
extra-judicial detentions, the ECHR stressed that the national government is
better placed to decide what measures are required to combat the threat to the
peace and should therefore be allowed a margin of appreciation. Ultimately, the
court concluded that due to the emergency conditions prevailing at the time, the
derogations from the protection of the right of liberty by the detentions were
permitted and did not constitute a violation of the Convention.49 The ECHR may
not have been able to condemn the detentions undertaken by the U.K. as violating
the Convention for fear of backlash. The court did find some investigative
techniques of the U.K. to be violations of the Convention, and may have feared
that an even more intrusive intervention in its security considerations would lead
to a hostile response against the court. The margin of appreciation allowed the
court to minimize its risk of incurring the ire of the U.K., without at the same time
granting a stamp of approval to all of its security policies.

B. The ECHR Delays Its Decisions to Avoid Backlash
As the last Subsection pointed out, the ECHR may consider the political
implications of its judgments and change its decisions to avoid a hostile response
by the country. Another option available for the ECHR to prevent backlash is to
delay its judgments on sensitive issues until the views of the countries and their
citizens become more hospitable to the judgment viewed by the ECHR as correct.
The ECHR can refuse to hear cases under its jurisdiction only under clearly
defined conditions. These conditions usually ensure that no significant violation
occurred.50 But the ECHR can strategically avoid deciding certain cases by
48

Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).

49

Id. at ¶¶ 207, 214.
The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as Amended by
Protocols No. 11 and No. 14 art. 35(3), Nov. 14, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5. reads:
The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under
Article 34 if it considers that:

50
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declaring that it doesn’t have jurisdiction. In this manner, the court can postpone
its decision on delicate issues for many years, until it believes that it can issue a
judgment on the issue without excessively jeopardizing its interests.
For example, in Bankovic v. Belgium,51 citizens of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia lodged a complaint against seventeen European countries that were
members of NATO.52 The applicants claimed that these countries violated the
Convention by their involvement in a NATO air strike that killed civilians. The
ECHR decided that it did not have jurisdiction to decide the case, because the
attack occurred outside of the territories of all countries subject to the
Convention. This decision was criticized as digressing from the ECHR’s previous
judgments,53 yet it allowed the ECHR to avoid finding violations in the actions of
the most powerful and influential countries in Europe and, thereby, to prevent a
serious backlash.54
Only ten years later, in the Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom55 and Al-Jedda v. United
Kingdom56 cases, which reviewed the U.K.’s military actions in Iraq, the ECHR
amended its doctrine regarding jurisdiction and decided that when countries
exercise extraterritorial control—even in territories that were never subject to the
Convention—the ECHR can still take the case. The ECHR may have calculated
that European countries would be much more tolerant to scrutiny of military
actions in Iraq in 2011 than to scrutiny of military actions in Yugoslavia in 2001.
Therefore, it was only in 2011 that the ECHR thought political conditions allowed

51

a. the application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the
Protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of individual
application; or
b. the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for
human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires
an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may
be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic
tribunal.
Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333.

52

Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the U.K.

53

See Alexandra Rüth & Mirja Trilsch, Bankovic v. Belgium (Admissibility), 97 AM. J. INT’L L 168, 172
(2003); Alexander Orakhelashvili, Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the Recent
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 529, 545 (2003). Previous ECHR
decisions on extraterritorial jurisdiction include: Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at
23–24, ¶ 62 (1995); Loizidou v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2234, 2234–35, ¶ 52; Cyprus v.
Turkey, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 25.

54
55

See Dothan, supra note 11, at 139.
Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 99.

56

Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, 2011-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 305.
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it to scrutinize the extraterritorial military actions of countries.57 But the outcome
of this strategy, in addition to adding harmful ambiguity to the ECHR’s doctrines
on jurisdiction, was that a clarification of the laws applicable to the exercise of
military power outside a country’s territory was delayed for an entire decade.
The postponement of cases due to political considerations adds on to other
factors in delaying the endorsement of emerging consensus by the ECHR. Other
reasons for delay include the rapidly increasing number of cases and the court’s
limited resources that lead to a huge backlog of undecided cases,58 as well as the
fact that countries can take years to form established policies on new legal
problems.59
If the ECHR takes too long to find an emerging consensus, countries are
deprived of the privilege of rapidly identifying the European consensus by
following the ECHR’s judgments. In this case, countries may have a strong
incentive to learn from other countries in an effort to immediately improve their
policies. According to the Jury Theorem’s logic, a country can improve its policies
by following the majority of countries in Europe. But countries that learn from
each other do not make decisions independently. Because all countries do not
make their policy decisions at the same time, the countries that establish policies
first are likely to influence the policy decisions of other countries, preventing those
countries from exercising fully independent judgment. Later on, countries may
not be able to distinguish between the countries that made their policy
independently and those that simply imitated other countries. Countries may
therefore follow policies that do not reflect a real majority decision of all the
countries. Instead, they may end up following later imitations of the countries that
just happened to make their policy first on the issue—a phenomenon known as
an “information cascade.”
When more and more countries imitate each other instead of making an
independent decision, the policy adopted by the majority does not enjoy the
informational benefit of the Jury Theorem.60 Consequently, when countries fail to
57

58

59
60

See Shai Dothan, How International Courts Enhance Their Legitimacy, 14 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 455, 475–
76 (2013).
In 2015, 40,650 applications were allocated to the judges, and 45,576 applications were disposed of
judicially, reducing the backlog of cases to 64,850. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2015 4 (2016), https://perma.cc/8LA7-GEHM.
This problem is addressed in Section VI.A, infra.
The use of comparative law by countries is therefore self-defeating—the more prevalent the use of
comparative law, the lower its informational benefits become for the countries that use it. This is a
problem with the argument of Posner and Sunstein in favor of the use of comparative law by
national courts, which they acknowledge in their paper. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 29, at
163. Elsewhere I argue that international, regional, and federal courts can use comparative law while
minimizing this problem. Therefore, when the ECHR uses the emerging consensus doctrine, it can
reach superior results compared to national courts that use comparative law. See Shai Dothan, The
Optimal Use of Comparative Law, 43 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y. 21, 23–24 (2014).
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decide independently, the ECHR would not be able to use emerging consensus to
make good policy choices.
In order to give countries an incentive not to follow other countries, the
ECHR must therefore try not to delay its policymaking. If countries know that
they can learn the optimal policy from the ECHR’s decision within a short time,
they will be more willing to make an independent decision. This way countries
know that the inferior policy they adopt on their own can soon be replaced by the
policies required by the ECHR. If countries are deciding independently, the
ECHR would be able to identify a genuine European consensus and lead to the
best possible policy.
Some countries may be reluctant to adhere to the inferior policies they can
adopt on their own, even if they know they would be quickly replaced by the
policy set by the ECHR. Yet if all countries realize that an independent decision
is essential to allow the ECHR to identify a European consensus, countries that
fail to decide independently would be branded as harming the collective interest.
To avoid this stigma, countries may be willing to maintain the laws they can reach
on their own for a short while, provided they know that the ECHR would discover
the emerging consensus as rapidly as possible.
The margin of appreciation doctrine allows the ECHR to identify the
European consensus without at the same time finding a country in violation. If
the ECHR knows that it can find the consensus without subjecting itself to
backlash, it will have no incentive to delay its decision by avoiding sensitive cases,
as it did in the Bankovic case. This will allow the ECHR to establish a European
consensus quickly, thereby reducing countries’ incentive to learn from each other.
Consequently, the European consensus would be a genuine one and reflect the
independent decisions of the countries.61

C. Emerging Consensus May Induce Countries to Follow a
Perceived Majority
In addition to the incentive to make good policies, another factor affecting
the countries’ decisions is the fear that they might be found in violation of the
61

If countries have scarce resources to invest in policy research and they know that the ECHR is
likely to decide quickly, however, they may rationally decide to invest fewer resources in determining
what policy to adopt, knowing that it would soon be replaced by the ECHR’s decision. In this
manner, the quality of every individual policy made by the countries would decline, and so would
the quality of the majority’s decision identified by emerging consensus. Fortunately, the Jury
Theorem shows that, in a large group of decision-makers who make decisions that are only slightly
better than random, the majority’s decision is still very likely to be correct (see the numerical
example in note 28, supra). Therefore, if the forty-seven countries of the Council of Europe make
independent decisions based on a cheap and easy assessment of the facts known to them, the
policies adopted by the majority will probably be good.
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Convention by the ECHR. If a country is found in violation, the finding damages
its reputation for compliance with its international commitments. The finding
signals that the country is not willing to sustain the costs necessary to maintain its
reputation for compliance with international law. Countries that are unwilling to
sustain such costs are perceived as bad actors—if they will not honor their treaty
commitments, they might break their promises to other countries in pursuit of
quick gains.62
Countries may change their policies to avoid a finding of violation against
them by the ECHR. To avoid a finding of violation, countries may try to conform
in advance to the standards of human rights they expect the ECHR would require
in the future. If countries know that the ECHR applies emerging consensus and
follows the majority of countries in Europe, they may try to find out what the
majority of countries are doing and adopt that policy before the ECHR finds them
in violation.
There is a danger in an attempt by all countries to conform to what they
perceive to be the policy adopted by the majority. Every country may realize that
all the other countries have the same incentive: to detect the majority and conform
to it so as not to be found in violation by the ECHR. If some countries start to
protect a certain human right, other countries may decide to follow suit, not
because they believe that protecting this right is good policy, but because they do
not want to be left out in a minority that does not protect this right. Since all
countries realize that all the other countries have the same fear of sticking to
minority policies and being found in violation, they would all grant protection to
the right. In this manner, European countries that try to guess what the European
majority prefers might end up adopting policies that would be rejected by the
majority of the countries in Europe had they decided independently of each
other.63
The fear that may dissuade countries from deciding independently is the fear
of falling behind the majority of countries and consequently being found in
violation. The ECHR can mitigate this fear through the margin of appreciation
doctrine. By using this doctrine, the ECHR can indicate the European consensus
62

See Dothan, supra note 11, at 119–22.; ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS:
A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 33–36 (2008).

63

This guessing game is known in Game Theory terms as a “Beauty Contest,” after a thought
experiment used by Keynes in which a group of newspaper readers can choose the six prettiest
photographs from a hundred photographs of models and win a prize if they choose the same
photographs chosen by the majority. In such a situation, the readers choose not what they think are
the prettiest pictures, but what they think the majority thinks that the majority thinks (etc.) are the
prettiest photographs. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST AND MONEY 156 (1936). Similarly, countries that fear a finding of violation if they remain
in the minority may try to guess what the majority of countries think that the majority prefers,
leading to results that cut against the views of the real majority.
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to the countries without at the same time finding them in violation. This ruling
gives the countries a proper warning before they are found in violation. It allows
countries to make their policies independently, knowing that they will not be
found in violation unless the ECHR warns them first, and indicates the consensus
that they should follow in the future.
For example, the ECHR indicated dissatisfaction with the U.K’s laws
regarding transsexuals for years before finding the U.K. in violation of the
Convention. In Rees v. United Kingdom,64 issued in 1986, the ECHR decided that
keeping a transsexual’s former sex on his birth certificate, which he has to display
at certain occasions, and preventing him from marrying a person of his opposite
current sex, do not violate the Convention. The court and the Commission (the
first tier of review at the time) called attention to the fact that several European
countries granted greater protection to transsexuals, although no clear consensus
was then detected.65 The court eventually granted the U.K. a margin of
appreciation that prevented a finding of violation, but at the same time it voiced
a concern for the suffering of transsexuals and indicated that the issue should be
kept under review in light of future scientific and social developments.
The ECHR continued to warn the U.K. that its policies were out of step
with proper protection of transsexuals in later cases. In Cossey v. United Kingdom,66
the ECHR highlighted again the severity of the problem and the need to keep the
issue under review. In Sheffield v. United Kingdom,67 the ECHR showed increasing
displeasure with the U.K.’s practices. In this case, the court stressed that only four
out of thirty-seven European countries studied prevented a reassignment of the
sex in the birth certificate. Finally, after warning the U.K. for fifteen years that its
practices digressed from the European consensus, the ECHR eventually found
the U.K. in violation in Goodwin v. United Kingdom,68 issued in 2002.
It appears that despite the great variability of the laws on transsexuals, the
ECHR was able to discern an emerging consensus against the U.K.’s practices
long before the Goodwin case. But up until then the ECHR had granted the U.K.
a margin of appreciation, thereby warning it that in the future it may be found in
violation without actually condemning it as breaking its treaty commitments. 69
64
65
66
67
68
69

Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986).
See id. at ¶¶ 37, 44.
Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1990).
Sheffield v. United Kingdom, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011, 2029.
Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
Some may argue that the ECHR was not convinced that a European consensus forbidding the
U.K.’s practices existed much prior to the Goodwin case. On this account, the ECHR used the
margin of appreciation as a way to delay the declaration of consensus until trends in Europe became
clearer while at the same time signaling to the U.K. that its actions were under close scrutiny. See
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This exercise allowed the ECHR to signal to European countries that they can
make their laws independently without fearing a finding of violation prior to being
warned. To the extent that this maneuver was successful, it may have incentivized
countries to make their policies independently without guessing what policy the
majority of the countries would opt for and thereby facilitated the finding of a
genuine European consensus by the ECHR.

VI. W HEN E MERGING C ONSENSUS C ANNOT BE D ISCOVERED
The preceding Sections showed that by using the margin of appreciation the
ECHR can either protect country policies that should be deferred to or create the
preconditions under which a genuine European consensus can emerge. This
Section addresses two slightly different situations. These are situations in which
emerging consensus cannot be adequately inferred from the practices of countries.
This does not mean that country policies should be deferred to, however. The
ECHR may use the margin of appreciation simply because it sees no justification
to intervene in country policies when there is no contrary European consensus.
But the ECHR may also decide to intervene in country policies by using other
legal doctrines.

A. The Law is Still in Flux
The Condorcet Jury Theorem recommends following the majority view in a
group of decision-makers because it relies on the assumption that each decisionmaker is making a rational decision and is more likely to be right than to be wrong.
When these conditions are fulfilled, the theorem mathematically guarantees that
the majority’s decision is more likely to be correct than the decision of each
individual decision-maker.70
Countries that make their laws in parliament after a public debate, or whose
national courts make policy based on reasoned decisions, resemble rational
decision-makers. This justifies the use of emerging consensus to aggregate the
views of countries and follow the majority’s view. But what if the relevant
conditions in the countries are currently changing? What if countries are amending
Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 10, at 317. This explanation may account for the Rees case. But in
contrast, when the Sheffield case was issued, the emerging consensus was already established in
Europe, at least regarding the reassignment of birth certificates. The court points to global trends
outside of Europe in favor of granting transsexual rights, trends that may have strengthened until
the Goodwin case was issued. Yet the influence of these trends was probably not the reason for the
different result. This article argues that the ECHR did not delay its finding of violation to wait until
it was certain that a consensus existed, but rather to allow the U.K. a clear prior warning before it
issued a judgment against it.
70

See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 29, at 141.
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their laws rapidly to address a new situation? Even if the law is in a state of flux,
all countries technically have a policy on the issue: after all, if a behavior is not
forbidden, then it is allowed. But this is policy by default. It does not stem from a
rational decision that responds to current circumstances and therefore there is no
reason to assume that it is correct. In these cases, there is no justification for using
emerging consensus.
S.A.S. v. France71 demonstrates the problems generated by new phenomena
that are addressed legally by some countries but not by others. The case concerned
the right of Muslim women in France to wear a full-face veil in public. When the
case was decided, France and Belgium were the only European countries that
legislated provisions forbidding concealment of the face in public.72 But, at the
time, the possibility of a similar ban was being discussed in some European
countries, and in others wearing full-face veils was so rare that it did not yet
constitute a real issue. Because most European countries did not consciously
address this problem and decide against a ban—rather, they simply did not make
any decision and left the permission to wear veils as the natural default position—
the court decided that there was no European consensus on the issue.73 The court
ultimately decided to defer to the French policy and not to find a violation of the
Convention.74
Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom criticized this position. They argued that
the contemporary laws in Europe clearly indicated a consensus of countries that
did not think it was necessary to legislate in this area.75 The complex comparative
law details in this case could be debated. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to judge
whether a country chose to maintain its laws on the issue or did not yet decide.
Nevertheless, it is clear that when countries did not make a rational choice to opt
for a certain legal regime or even to sustain the regime they have in place in light
of changing conditions, their current laws do not possess any decisional
advantages that can justify the use of the emerging consensus doctrine.

B. Choice Between Several Options
Condorcet indicated an exception to his Jury Theorem that is known as the
Condorcet Paradox. The Condorcet Paradox shows that when a group of several
decision-makers have to choose between more than two potential options, the
choice of the group’s majority does not always follow the condition of transitivity.
This means that the way in which the votes of the group are counted determines
71
72

S.A.S. v. France, 2014-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 341.
See id. at ¶ 40.

74

See id. at 380–81, ¶ 156.
See id. at 381, ¶ 157–59.

75

See id. at 387–88, ¶ 19 (Nußberger, J., & Jäderblom, J., dissenting).
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what constitutes the policy preferred by the majority. Under these conditions, no
meaningful majority can be identified.
The Condorcet Paradox could prevent the use of emerging consensus when
countries make their legal choice out of several possible options because of several
conflicting considerations. As the Condorcet Paradox shows, if countries can
consider conflicting considerations, the way they rate their preferences may lack
transitivity.
In judgments that could show an awareness of this problem, the ECHR has
been reluctant to identify an emerging consensus when countries make similar
policies for different reasons. The A, B, & C v. Ireland76 case is a potential example.
The court decided that since countries in Europe had not reached a consensus on
whether a fetus should be considered a person, the apparent consensus in their
legislation regarding greater access to abortion cannot solely determine whether
Ireland’s prohibition of abortion struck a fair balance between the rights of the
fetus and the rights of the mother.77
This characterization of the boundaries of the issue, where emerging
consensus should be discovered, was criticized by some judges as requiring too
much for the discovery of emerging consensus and by others as requiring too little.
On the one hand, Judge Rozakis and five others wrote a dissenting opinion
arguing that the decision when life begins is irrelevant since this was not the
question before the court. The question was not whether the fetus was a person;
it was whether the right of the fetus—person or not—weighs less than the right
of the mother in most European countries. The majority of countries answer this
question in the affirmative, forming a consensus.78 On the other hand, Judge
Geoghegan wrote a concurring opinion arguing that the existence of abortion
legislation does not form any consensus regarding the striking of a balance
between all the relevant interests. Many reasons could lead to the adoption of
legislation, and some countries may not have a public interest in the protection of
the unborn as exists in Ireland. The consensus, argued Geoghegan, should be on
striking the right balance, but if other countries have other public interests, they
may be striking a different balance and therefore not forming any consensus.79
While A, B, & C seems to suggest that the reasons behind country choice
of legal policies matter, it does not demonstrate how the Condorcet Paradox
actually unfolds. To understand how the Condorcet Paradox materializes,
consider another issue that the ECHR dealt with: prisoners’ voting rights. This
issue is addressed in Hirst v. United Kingdom.80 Under certain assumptions about the
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underlying views of countries on the rights of prisoners to vote, the Condorcet
Paradox appears. These assumptions are just possible legal views on the right to
vote. The paper makes no attempt to suggest that they actually reflect the views
of specific European countries, but they can help highlight the theoretical
possibility of the Condorcet Paradox.
In Hirst, the ECHR was tasked with deciding whether a blanket ban on the
right of prisoners to vote violates the Convention. The judgment related that
eighteen countries in Europe allowed all their prisoners to vote, thirteen countries
prevented all their prisoners from voting (including the U.K., whose policies were
being examined), and twelve countries had taken away the right to vote from some
prisoners under certain conditions.81 Countries that condition the prevention of
prisoners from voting on certain facts usually consider the number of prison years
in the verdict, the severity of the crime, and the connection between the crime
and the democratic process. Alternatively, they leave the decision on taking the
right to vote to the convicting judges.82
The countries of Europe thus choose from at least three options: (A) allow
all prisoners to vote; (B) take away the right to vote from some prisoners under
certain conditions; (C) deny all prisoners the right to vote. An analysis of
judgments from countries around the world on the issue of prisoners’ voting
rights reveals that there are at least three distinct views on the nature of the right
to vote: (1) voting is an inalienable right that cannot be taken away; (2) voting is a
revocable right: although it belongs to the voter, it can be taken away under certain
conditions; (3) voting is a privilege: it does not belong to citizens and they may
only use this privilege under certain conditions. Even in the simplest case
imaginable—three countries with different views on the nature of the right to vote
choosing from a menu of three policy options—the Condorcet Paradox may
theoretically appear.83
Countries that view voting as an inalienable right prefer policy A over all
others. When they have to choose their second-best option, their choice is
impossible to predict with certainty. Perhaps they would prefer policy B over
policy C to let as many prisoners as possible vote.
Countries that view voting as a revocable right would certainly prefer policy
B over all others. Their second-best policy is a mystery. Some countries view
disenfranchisement as problematic and would try to reserve it only to rare and
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special circumstances. They may prefer letting everybody vote to denying the vote
to all prisoners. In other countries, however, giving all prisoners the right to vote
is completely unacceptable. This policy preserves the voting rights of prisoners
that these countries think definitely should not vote, for example prisoners who
committed severe crimes. For the sake of the argument, let us follow the latter
type of countries and choose policy C as better than policy A (denying the right
to vote to all prisoners over giving the right to vote to everyone).
Countries that view voting as a privilege often subject prisoners to what is
known as “civic death”: because prisoners violated the social contract, they all
deserve to be disenfranchised.84 These countries will clearly favor policy C. Their
second-best policy depends on what these countries view as more important: to
treat all prisoners equally and signal a clear social stigma, or to disenfranchise as
many prisoners as possible. In most countries, the disenfranchisement of
prisoners does not have any effect on election results. 85 The policy can therefore
be viewed as a question of principle and not of strategy. Countries that view the
principle of treating all prisoners the same as more important than the number of
disenfranchised prisoners could prefer policy A over policy B. They would prefer
to let everyone vote instead of giving the right to vote only to some prisoners.
Table 1 presents the hypothetical preferences explained above:
Table 1: Possible Preferences of Countries with Different Views on Voting
Rights
First best
(1) Voting as an
inalienable right
(2) Voting as a revocable
right
(3) Voting as a privilege

84

85

Second best

Third best

A

B

C

B

C

A

C

A

B

See Susan Easton, The Prisoner’s Right to Vote and Civic Responsibility: Reaffirming the Social Contract?, 56
PROBATION J. 224, 227–28 (2009).
The U.S. may prove to be an exception to that rule since prisoners’ disenfranchisement in this
country may actually change election results. What accounts for the U.S.’ unique position are the
high number of prisoners, the strict disenfranchisement policies that often include convicts that
were already released from prison, the large number of black prisoners that traditionally vote for
the Democratic party, and the concentration of some of these prisoners in swing states such as
Florida and Virginia, which shift between the two major parties and can therefore determine
election results. See Harry J. Enten, Felon Voting Rights Have a Bigger Impact on Elections than Voter ID
Laws, GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013), https://perma.cc/2PSX-4DJ7.
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Under these assumptions, most countries (two out of three) prefer A over
B. Most countries also prefer B over C. At the same time, however, most countries
prefer C over A. If the preferences of the countries are indeed A>B>C>A, their
preferences are intransitive. The majority’s choice depends on the order in which
the countries are asked to rate one policy option over another. The Condorcet
Paradox appears.
In the example above, the Condorcet Paradox emerges because countries
are taking into account several different considerations when they determine their
preferences. Countries care both about the number of prisoners allowed to vote
and about treating prisoners equally. Legal systems face such difficult cases all the
time, but they usually use the legal process to break complex decisions into a series
of simpler choices that avoid the problem of intransitivity.86
The Hirst case does not provide an easy way to break up the choices of the
countries and find a majority that is not subject to the Condorcet Paradox. If
emerging consensus fails as a result of the Condorcet Paradox, it may be beneficial
to limit its use by widening the margin of appreciation granted to the country. But,
in contrast to the other cases mentioned in Sections IV and V, the use of the
margin of appreciation neither increases the chance of a better decision in the case
at hand nor improves the conditions for the applicability of the Jury Theorem. In
fact, the court can use other doctrines to intervene in domestic policies, and then
there is no necessary justification to grant countries an especially wide margin of
appreciation. The court’s decision in Hirst to strike down the U.K.’s policies on
prisoners’ voting rights based on other normative arguments besides emerging
consensus—such as preventing indiscriminate measures that infringe important
convention rights87—could be justified along these lines.

VII. C ONCLUSION
At first sight, the margin of appreciation may seem like a way to limit the
consequences of the emerging consensus doctrine to suitable circumstances. For
example, margin of appreciation permits countries to maintain laws that differ
from the laws of the rest of Europe when they face conditions that are different
from those of other European countries. This narrow use of margin of
appreciation allows the ECHR to sustain good policies that suit the interests of
the country under scrutiny.
But a closer look at the margin of appreciation doctrine reveals that it can
do much more than protect policies that suit countries with unique characteristics.
If the ECHR and the countries under its jurisdiction behave strategically—as they
often must in order to protect vital interests—the ECHR may err in identifying
86
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the true consensus of Europe. The margin of appreciation doctrine can help shape
the incentives of the ECHR as an institution and the incentives of countries in
ways that allow the ECHR to discover a genuine European consensus.
This implies that sometimes the ECHR must grant countries a margin of
appreciation even though it is convinced that this would maintain sub-optimal
policies adopted by a particular country. This broader delimitation of the margin
of appreciation doctrine is essential for a real European consensus to emerge—a
prerequisite for the ability of emerging consensus to lead to good policy decisions.
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